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The Composition of the German Bundestag since 1949: 
Long-Term Trends and Institutional Effects 
Christopher Anderson* 
Abstract: This paper traces some of the main long-term 
trends with regard to the socio-demographic and political 
composition of the German Bundestag between 1949 and 
1990. Moreover, the paper seeks to establish to what extent 
the logic of Germany's electoral system influences the re-
cruitment of Bundestag members with particular charac-
teristics. 
The study of political, social, and economic elites has a long and distinguished 
tradition in the social sciences. Classic examples include, but are not limited to, 
the works of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Mills, Lasswell, and Dahrendorf, to name 
just a select few. Sociologists in general, and political sociologists in particular, 
have long been interested in the distribution of power, the recruitment of po-
litical elites, their social and political interrelationships, and the consequences 
of elite behavior for the functioning of democratic polities (Weege 1992). Thus 
it should not come as a surprise that the study of elites has been particularly 
extensive in Germany, where the path toward democracy has been somewhat 
»uneven« (Hoffmann-Lange 1989, 1991). In particular, there have been a num-
ber of empirical historical-sociological studies on German political elites, co-
vering much of the period between the late 19th century and modern-day 
(West) Germany. (1) To name them all would take up the remaining space of 
this paper. Yet, until recently, there have been only a modest number of em-
pirical studies of one of the most visible groups of political elites in the Federal 
Republic of Germany: The members of the Bundestag, the German national 
legislature. Those studies that are available on the Bundestag generally focus 
on objective socio-demographic characteristics of its members at particular 
points in time (cf. Kaack 1967,1969,1971,1988; Müller 1983), or they seek to 
investigate the functioning of the legislature as a parliamentary body, on oc-
casion with the help of surveys of, or about, Bundestag deputies (cf. Löwen-
berg 1967; Löwenberg and Patterson 1979; Herzog et al. 1990). However, there 
have been few studies which analyze the composition of the Bundestag over 
time and few which explore the consequences of Germany's electoral system 
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for the distribution of Bundestag members with particular social or political 
characteristics. In fact, comparative political scientists have only recently re-
discovered the study of the composition of legislatures (Lijphart 1984, 1990; 
Rule 1987). 
This is all the more surprising as the German Bundestag provides an intri-
guing setting for the study of political elites given that it allows for the exa-
mination of questions that are of interest to historians, political sociologists, 
and political scientists: First, the study of the social and political characteristics 
of the Bundestag as a representative body allows us to address the issue of 
democratic development in Germany after World War II and the development 
of German society in general (cf. Dahrendorf 1967), as well as the consequen-
ces of the unification of the two German states in 1990 for German political life 
(cf. Anderson et al. 1993). Secondly, Germany is a particularly interesting case 
for political scientists interested in the consequences of political institutions 
because of the unique nature of Germany's electoral system (Kaase 1984). In 
line with these research traditions, this paper seeks to achieve two things: First 
it attempts to portray some of the major trends and changes in the Bundestag's 
composition for the period between the founding of the Federal Republic in 
1949 and the unification of Germany in 1990, using key socio-demographic 
and political variables such as age, education, seniority, and gender. Second, it 
seeks to demonstrate some of the — long suspected — consequences inherent 
in the logic of the German electoral system (cf. Duverger 1954; Kitzinger 
1957). 
The Composition of the Bundestag, 1949-1990 
How, and to what extent, has the composition of the Bundestag changed over 
time and to what extent do these changes reflect changes in (West) German 
society as a whole? In order to answer this question, we will examine the 
aggregate dynamics of the Bundestag's composition with regard to age, senio-
rity, education, and the representation of women. 
Age and education are useful macro-indicators for changes that take place in 
a society as a whole, as well as the changes that take place in a society's 
representative body, i.e. its national legislature. Unless otherwise specified, this 
analysis is based on data compiled by the author on the basis of various vo-
lumes of Schindler's Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundes-
tages, augmented by the most recent editions of Kürschner's Volkshandbuch 
Deutscher Bundestag. The average age of Bundestag deputies has fluctuated 
between 52.3 years (1961) and 46.6 (1972). The newly elected 1990 Bundes-
tag's mean age of 48.7 years fits in well with those past figures. 
It is interesting to note, however, that there was a period of declining mean 
age in the Bundestag between 1961 and 1972, followed by a distinct increase in 
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Figure 1. 
Average Age of Bundestag Deputies (in years), 1949-1990 
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the subsequent period, peaking in 1987. This decline was probably to a large 
extent the result of the Nazi period. If we think about the elites elected to the 
Bundestag as representatives of their respective political generations, it appears 
evident that the average age of Bundestag members decreased because of a lack 
of politically experienced and »respectable« elites available for recruitment in 
the 1960s after the generation socialized during the Second Empire and the 
early Weimar period started to retire (Dalton 1993: 219). 
The CDU/CSU as the party of the middle and upper-middle class has had 
relatively weak ties to the unions and industrial workers in general, while the 
SPD, as the classical party of the trade union movement, has traditionally relied 
on support from labor and unions; more recently, it has also been aligned with 
white collar workers and »technocrats« (Baker et al. 1981; Alber 1991). In 
contrast to the SPD, the CDU/CSU has a higher proportion of self-employed 
and university graduates than the SPD (Kaack 1988; Müller 1983), and 
CDU/CSU deputies are also more likely to have held a job of higher occupa-
tional status before their election to the Bundestag (Müller 1983; Anderson 
1989). Levels of formal education, which can also be taken as an indicator of 
social status, displays a pattern that is somewhat different than that of age. In 
the last forty-some years there has ben a trend toward the »Akademisierung« 
(academization), not only of German society, but also of the Bundestag as a 
representative body of that society (see Figure 2). 
In essence this means that the percentage of deputies with college or uni-
versity level education has increased dramatically since 1949. The daily busi-
ness of a highly developed and differentiated legislature appears to have re-
quired ever higher levels of expertise and skill, i.e. higher levels of education. 
In 1980, 82.5% of all Bundestag members had attended college, compared to 
only 44% in 1953. Until 1983 there had been quite distinct differences between 
the political parties with regard to their Bundestag deputies' levels of formal 
education. FDP and CDU/CSU Bundestag groups had the greatest percentages 
of deputies who had gone to college, while only slightly more than half of the 
SPD members had done so. These differences have been narrowed by the late 
1980s. 
Another good indicator for the professionalization of political life in the 
Federal Republic is the length of service in the Bundestag. Examining the 
development of the United States House of Representatives since the founding 
of the American Republic, Nelson Polsby (1968) finds that the expansion of 
seniority is a key indicator of political institutionalization. If we take the aver-
age number of years served in the Bundestag as an indicator for seniority, 
Figure 3 shows that the length of service in the Bundestag in fact increased 
steadily after the founding of the Federal Republic, thus indicating the rapid 
and continued institutionalization of the West German political system (cf. 
Baker et al. 1981; Polsby 1968). 
Even though the election of new and inexperienced deputies from the former 
East-Germany in 1990 means that the overall level of seniority has inevitably 
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declined after the last election, seniority has steadied around 7 to 8 years of 
service in the Bundestag. Given that almost all Bundestag deputies are actively 
involved in politics at the local, party, Land, or European level before being 
elected to the Bundestag, this is one more indicator for a trend toward the 
thorough professionalization of the political elite in the Federal Republic during 
the last 45 years. 
Although women now constitute the majority of eligible voters in Germany, 
they have traditionally been greatly underrepresented in the German Bundestag 
(see Figure 4). In the period between 1949 and 1980, the percentage of Bundes-
tag deputies who are women has fluctuated between 8.8% (1953) and 5.8% 
(1972). With the beginning of the 1980s and the electoral success of the 
Greens, however, pressure on the big parties (CDU/CSU, SPD) increased to 
involve a greater number of women in party politics and to eventually nominate 
more women for election to the Bundestag. Aside from the pressure for change 
because of ideological reasons, the proposals to include more women at any 
level of politics were also seen by party strategists as a means to make the 
parties more attractive for women voters. 
Beginning in 1983, there is a marked overall increase in the number of 
Bundestag members who are women. By 1987, women constituted over 15% of 
the Bundestag. The 1990 election brought yet another increase in the number of 
female deputies with more than 1/5 of the Bundestag now being female 
(20.5%). Even though the reasons for this development are likely to be com-
plex, some preliminary explanations can be given. The increase is almost 
certainly not a result of the unification since the percentage of women members 
from the East is almost identical to that of the West (21.6 vs. 20.3%). It can 
safely be assumed that the old levels of female representation in the People's 
Chamber of the GDR were artificially high and of no political consequence 
given the minimal political activity and influence of the GDR's nominal legis-
lature until 1990. (2) Rather, the trend toward the greater representation of 
women should be seen as real and, especially in the case of the Greens and the 
SPD, artificially induced with affirmative action-like quota programs which 
require a certain number of party functionaries to be female. We find that there 
have been distinct patterns of female representation in the past forty-some 
years. First, it is clear that the push for more female representation did not show 
results until the 1980s. Aside from the Greens who had 35.7 (1983) and 56.8 % 
(1987) women among their members, the commitment to include more women 
delegates seems to have been strongest in the SPD and weakest in the 
CDU/CSU. Political and social worldview, coupled with institutional barriers, 
may explain some of the differences between the parties. What is noteworthy, 
however, is the fact that despite the official SED rhetoric before the fall of the 
GDR regime, the proportion of women involved in the political process (here 
expressed as the number of women elected from all mainstream political par-
ties) is not significantly different in the East than in the West. As the 
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CDU/CSU, SPD and the FDP have more than doubled the proportion of wo-
men serving in the Bundestag, it appears evident, however, that the greater 
involvement of women in party politics and as representatives in the Bundestag 
will alter the political landscape considerably. 
Ossis and Wessis in the new Bundestag 
The unification of the two German states constituted the most radical break in 
Germany's post-war history. Aside from the revision of institutional structures 
in the former GDR, it also meant the incorporation of the former East Germany 
into the Federal Republic's electoral system (Kaase 1993; Anderson 1993). 
Given the radical changes in East Germany during the course of the unification 
process, the lack of a democratic experience, the lack of a western-style poli-
tical infrastructure, and a lack of professional democratic politicians, one might 
expect significant differences in the social and political composition of the 
representatives from the East and the West. Some researchers have argued, on 
the other hand, that the West German party system was transferred to the East 
during the unification year (Kaase and Gibowski 1990; Lehmbruch 1990). Gi-
ven that 40 years of communist rule left little room for the formation of partisan 
attachments as they are usually developed in advanced industrialized nations 
(Roth 1990), the East German partisan landscape is seen by these scholars as 
having been invaded by the strategically highly skilled West German party 
machines. (3) Should such a super-imposition of the western party system ex-
tend to the area of candidate recruitment, we would expect to find relatively 
few differences between the representatives from the East and the West. Ho-
wever, one thing was certain: The new Bundestag was going to consist of a 
sizable majority of experienced and professional politicians from the West 
(many of whom had considerable seniority), and a minority of inexperienced, 
unpolished, freshmen from the East, most of whom had been catapulted into 
political office during the previous year. As candidate recruitment is largely 
recruitment by the party (Kaack 1969), how were the political parties to select 
individuals as candidates in the East? What qualifications and characteristics 
were to be applied? Keeping in mind that self-selection naturally played a role 
as well, it is important to remember the problems inherent in recruiting viable 
candidates for elective office from a society that had just thrown off the burden 
of an authoritarian regime and where individual involvement with the com-
munist state was widespread. Under these circumstances, what kinds of indi-
viduals would one expect to represent the former GDR in the new Bundestag? 
The following observations and calculations are based on a data set of the 1990 
Bundestag compiled by the author with the help of Kurschner's Volkshandbuch 
Deutscher Bundestag for the 12th legislative period. (4) 
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A politically interesting difference emerges when we compare the average 
age of deputies elected in the former GDR with those elected in the old Federal 
Republic. Easterners are younger than Westerners. While the average age of 
deputies representing the West hovers around 50 for the three major parties, (5) 
deputies elected from the East are substantially younger (44.5 vs. 49.9 yrs.). 
This distinction comes with a little twist. In contrast to their western counter-
parts, among whom the age-differences between males and females are relati-
vely small, the CDU women elected in the East are much younger than their 
male colleagues (38.0 vs. 46.0 yrs.) and thus more similar in age to those from 
the Greens/B90 and the PDS (average age 36.0 and 35.3 yrs., respectively). The 
youngest male deputies elected in East Germany come from the SPD (43.5 
yrs.), while the oldest male deputies represent the former Communist party, i.e. 
the PDS/LL (49.8 yrs.). 
With regard to formal levels of education in the 1990 Bundestag as a whole, 
we find that the Greens/B90 (100%) and the PDS/LL (88.2%) have the greatest 
proportions of college-educated members in the 1990 Bundestag. The FDP 
leads the rest of the pack (82.3%), followed by the CDU/CSU (77.5%) and the 
SPD (74.1%). However, these numbers again tell only half the story. When we 
compare Easterners and Westerners, a uniform and curious distinction emerges: 
Ironically, the deputies from the former »Workers , and Peasants' State« have 
higher levels of education, regardless of political party. The difference is most 
pronounced for the SPD (94.1% [East] vs. 70.73% [West]) and least noticeable 
for the CDU/CSU. Possible explanations for the SPD's pattern of high edu-
cational levels among its members is the non-existence of a labor movement in 
the East before the unification of the two Germanies, as well as the novelty of 
the SPD in the East. Since less deputies from the East are organized in unions 
(Miiller 1992), the SPD group in the Bundestag is thus a curious mix of mem-
bers from the West, where the ties between the unions and the SPD have a long 
and institutionalized tradition, and members from the East where the SPD is a 
new creation led by intellectuals. 
However, the other parties also have higher levels of college-educated ea-
stern members. This becomes even more apparent when we look at the pro-
portion of members with doctoral degrees. Almost half of the eastern FDP 
deputies have a doctorate (47.1%) as compared to a quarter of the FDP's 
western delegates (25.8%). The respective numbers for the SPD are a quarter in 
the East (28.4%) and a fifth in the West (19.0%). Only the CDU/CSU has more 
members with doctorates among the western deputies (30.3%) than among their 
eastern colleagues (26.6%). 
What are the implications of these findings? When the overall trends of age 
and education are examined, the new Bundestag appears to be a picture of 
continuity (cf. Figures 1 and 3). However, the aggregated results obscure po-
tentially important and noteworthy consequences. Female politicians, who in 
the past had to prove their electability — which can be expressed as a function 
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of age equalling experience — and thus tended to be older than male Bundestag 
members (Schindler 1984), are now younger across all political parties. This 
may be due to a change in attitudes when it comes to candidate recruitment 
within the parties. It is interesting to note in this context that female eastern 
CDU delegates are younger than any other group within the CDU/CSU (East or 
West). Whether this means greater diversity within the CDU cannot be predic-
ted, but the example of Angela Merkel (now Minister for Family Affairs) who 
has been a protege of Chancellor Kohl might indicate greater recognition for 
women or eastern deputies who appear to be more progressive with regard to 
social issues. 
What seems to be more important, however, is the fact that the eastern 
politicians are a good deal younger than their western counterparts. To what 
extent that has political consequences cannot be answered conclusively here. 
Young age coupled with no seniority appears to be a recipe for reduced influen-
ce in the Bundestag at least in the short run, especially since the deputies from 
the East are far outnumbered by those from the West. However, while the 
overall numbers suggest that the new Bundestag is not more nor any less 
educated than its predecessors, the differences between the eastern and the 
western deputies show that a greater proportion of Easterners has gone to 
college. The eastern part of Germany is thus represented in the new Bundestag 
by individuals with extraordinarily high levels of formal education. While they 
may be younger than representatives from the West, they are also individuals 
who may find it relatively easy to adapt to the new (political) environment. 
These long-term trends considered in this section give a first quick look at 
the composition of the Bundestag during the forty-some years of the Federal 
Republic's existence. It is found that in the aggregate, (6) the new Bundestag is 
not radically different from the older ones, yet, that there are also some subtle 
distinctions which are interesting and noteworthy from a political and socio-
logical perspective. Whether the relative similarity of East and West German 
Bundestag members is the result of planned recruitment on the part of the 
western political parties or whether and to what extent they are the result of 
local idiosyncracies or self-selection is difficult or impossible to assess with the 
data at hand. It is also difficult to speculate about the political implications of 
demographic trends without considering the institutional arrangements and 
structures that constrain the patterns of recruitment to the Bundestag. Thus, the 
next section will examine the composition of the Bundestag with regard to the 
strategic positions of the different political parties. 
11 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 18 — 1993 — No. 1, 3-26
Using the System: The Politics of Composition 
It is well known, or at least widely believed, that the laws that govern electoral 
systems have politically non-neutral consequences. The most famous conse-
quences are those which affect the number of parties in a system (Duverger 
1954; Rae 1967; Riker 1976; Lijphart 1990). Electoral structures and rules, 
however, also provide institutional constraints and opportunities for the recruit-
ment of elites (Lijphart 1991). The remainder of this paper seeks to disentangle 
some of the consequences of electoral laws for the political and demographic 
profile of legislators arising from the laws that govern election to the German 
Bundestag, and it identifies some of the more »strategic« opportunities that 
influence the Bundestag's composition — opportunities that are distinctively 
structured for different political parties. 
The German electoral system provides two paths to the national parliament 
as it combines single-member, simple majority districts, and proportional 
representation in one electoral system. (7) Half of the deputies are nominated 
and elected directly in districts (Wahlkreise) by simple majority vote. (8) The 
other half of the Bundestag members are nominated by the political parties at 
the Land (state) level and elected via party lists. Voters have two votes on 
election day: A first vote (Erststimme) for the district candidate, and a second 
vote (Zweitstimme) for the political party. Voters can split these votes whiche-
ver way they prefer. The total number of parliamentary seats a party is entitled 
to is determined by the overall percentage the party receives nationwide on the 
second vote, i.e. through the PR element of the electoral system. The winners 
of the district races are automatically members of the Bundestag, whereas the 
remaining seats the party is entitled to are filled with the candidates from the 
rank-ordered party lists. Once in the Bundestag, the deputies (Abgeordnete) 
have equal status as representatives irrespective of the mechanism by which 
they were elected. (9) 
Political parties use the party lists to secure the election of preferred candi-
dates by placing them high on the rank-ordered lists. It is crucial to note that 
these candidates typically include parliamentary leaders and candidates that 
would only have a marginal chance of winning a district seat (Kaack 1969). 
Most of the district candidates are also safely placed on the party lists so that 
their election to the Bundestag is secured even if they lose their district races. It 
is widely assumed that political parties try to balance the composition of their 
parliamentary groups in the Bundestag by including candidates with particular 
characteristics, such as religious denomination, interest group membership, re-
gional affiliation (Lowenberg 1967; Lowenberg and Patterson 1979; Nohlen 
1978), or, more recently, expertise in new technologies (Kaack 1988). 
The candidates for the district races are nominated at the local, i.e. district, 
level, whereas the candidates on the party lists are nominated at state level 
party conventions. Hence, there is no centralized formal strategic planning by 
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national party elites. Nevertheless, it would be fallacious to presume that the 
absence of formal authority over the nominating process implies an absence of 
informal influence or coordination by the national party organizations. Thus, 
the candidate selection process is not the result of purely arbitrary candidate 
nominations in the individual districts or at the level of the individual state 
party organizations; more likely, it is the product of informal coordination 
between different levels of party hierarchies. 
The Strategic Position 
German political parties have different opportunities to elect individuals to the 
Bundestag because they are not equally successful in the single-member dis-
tricts (Wahlkreise). More specifically, since the candidates are nominated at the 
state and district levels, and since the parties have different regional strong-
holds, they encounter different strategic opportunities depending on their suc-
cess in different districts, regions and individual Länder (federal states). Figure 
5 is intended to demonstrate the parties' differential success in the Wahlkreise 
in the country as a whole between 1949 and 1990. Only the Wahlkreise won by 
the CDU/CSU are shown as the success of the SPD in the Wahlkreise is almost 
exactly the reverse, given that these parties have usually won district mandates. 
Figure 6 shows the proportion of safe seats won by the CDU/CSU and the SPD, 
where a safe seat is defined as a seat where the member receives 55% or more 
of the vote. Percentages, instead of the actual number of seats, are given since 
the total number of Bundestag deputies has changed over time. Between 1949 
and 1953 there were 242 directly elected members. With the accession of the 
Saarland, the number was increased in 1957 to 247. From 1965 to 1987, the 
number was constantly at 248 directly elected members, and in 1990 the num-
ber was increased to 328. In 1990 the PDS/LL and the FDP each won one 
district in the East and in 1949 there were a number of small parties that also 
won a small number of direct seats. These are not included here. 
Thus parties are able to place on the lists those candidates who either could 
not expect to win a Wahlkreis, had a chance of losing a district race, or did not 
run in a Wahlkreis. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens, for 
instance, did not expect to win any district races and therefore could only 
utilize the party lists for the selection of all candidates. In many cases they did 
field candidates for the districts, but this can largely be considered a symbolic 
act. 
In general, the CDU/CSU usually wins more districts than the SPD (except 
for the SPD's heydays in 1969 and 1972) and it has a larger number of safe 
seats. Moreover, the distribution of Wahlkreis and Party List members within 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD parliamentary groups is not evenly balanced. The 
disparity between the number of members elected via the Wahlkreise versus 
13 
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those elected via the party list is greater for the CDU/CSU than for the SPD. 
The majority of the CDU/CSU members are elected via the Wahlkreise, whe-
reas the distribution of Wahlkreis vis-a-vis party list delegates is quite balanced 
for the SPD. This disparity stems largely from the fact that the CDU/CSU 
usually wins almost all the Wahlkreis races in such big states as Baden-Würt-
temberg, Bavaria, and Schleswig-Holstein and is generally more successful in 
the Wahlkreise in other states as well. The SPD, on the other hand, has such 
regional district-level strongholds only in the smallest Länder (Saarland, Ham-
burg and Bremen) and wins about half of the districts in Lower-Saxony and 
North-Rhine Westphalia. That means that in 1987, for example, the CDU/CSU 
sent only five party-list delegates, but eighty-nine Wahlkreis delegates to the 
Bundestag from Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, while 
the ratio for the SPD from those Länder was forty party list candidates versus 
only four Wahlkreis nominees. Hence, the overall disparity between the SPD 
and CDU/CSU with regard to the number of members elected via the Wahl-
kreise versus those via the party list is due to these different regional strong-
holds (»Hochburgen«). What does this disparity mean? The CDU/CSU has less 
opportunity for party list maneuvers than the SPD, especially in the big sou-
thern Länder. Therefore, the SPD is in a better position to use the party list 
selection process strategically, and somewhat more independently of regional 
strength, while the CDU/CSU has more opportunities to determine who gets 
elected from districts. 
Examples of Strategic Placement 
Earlier work by political scientists has demonstrated that PR systems, in con-
trast to first-past-the-post systems, favor the representation of minorities in 
general (cf. Lijphart 1991) and women in particular (Rule 1987). Naturally, 
strategic behavior by party elites is difficult to observe for social scientists and 
systematic empirical evidence for such behavior is notoriously hard to come 
by. (10) Thus, we usually have to rely on ex-post-facto indicators in the form of 
published sources, here in the form of various handbooks. 
In spite of the trend toward more female representation in the Bundestag (cf. 
Figure 4), Wahlkreise have tended to be reserved for the more traditional party 
candidates, i.e. men. It has been argued that this is due to the nature of the local 
candidate selection process for district candidates, and because of the greater 
visibility of the traditional district candidate which increases the voter's identi-
fication with the party (Kitzinger 1957; Müller 1983). 
Figure 7 shows the parties' total number of women in the Bundestag as well 
as the proportion of CDU/CSU and SPD members elected in the districts who 
are women. The SPD and the CDU/CSU clearly have a smaller proportion of 
women elected in the Wahlkreise than via lists. It is also clear that the SPD has 
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a higher proportion of women in its parliamentary group irrespective of their 
route to the Bundestag. However, the overall number of successful female 
Wahlkreis candidates has increased substantially as well since the founding of 
the Federal Republic. 
As the stimulus to elect more women to the Bundestag has been a fairly 
recent one because of new demands articulated in a changing political envir-
onment, female delegates are still a clear minority in both parties. The fact that 
mass-based, catch-all parties tend to underscore the heterogeneity of their out-
look and composition is not such a new and recent phenomenon and it has long 
been taken for granted that parties use the electoral system to achieve desired 
ends. Whether other candidates with unusual or atypical characteristics are 
elected to the Bundestag via the party lists can be assessed by examining the 
distribution of education and union members among the parties' parliamentary 
groups. 
The following analysis is based on a data set of the 11th Bundestag, elected 
in 1987, also compiled by the author. These data exclude deputies from Berlin 
as they had a special status in the Bundestag prior to 1990 and since they were 
not elected by the same mechanisms as the other members. I will rely on 
analyzing the composition of the CDU/CSU and SPD members as these are the 
two only parties that won direct mandates in the district and thus provide a 
control group with whom the party list delegates can be compared. Of course, 
the data set constitutes only a cross-sectional glimpse of candidate placement. 
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To what extent the findings presented here are generalizable will have to be 
established by further research. 
Does the composition of the parties' parliamentary groups reflect these dif-
ferences or is the internal composition of the parties' parliamentary groups 
balanced with regard to union membership and socio-economic status? The 
daily business of a highly developed legislature may require expertise that is 
more easily and predictably recruited by use of the party lists. Moreover, in the 
case of the CDU/CSU, placing more union members in the Bundestag may be a 
way to satisfy the demands of intra-party constituencies without running the 
risk of losing voter identification with the district candidates. 
In order to answer this question, education is first employed for the subse-
quent analysis as an indicator of social status. The analysis shows that there is 
little variation with regard to education between the CDU/CSU party list and 
Wahlkreis deputies. The only significant difference between the two is the 
greater number of PhD's elected via the Wahlkreise (38.5% - 29.1%). 
The composition of the SPD members, however, offers a striking distinction. 
SPD Wahlkreis deputies are much more likely than party list delegates to have 
only a secondary school education (43.0% vs. 28.3%), whereas the party list 
delegates are much more likely to hold a doctorate than those elected in the 
districts (26.4% vs. 12.7%). Thus, our findings for the SPD are consistent with 
the idea that party lists are used for the recruitment of legislators with desired 
characteristics. (11) 
It is possible that an analysis of occupational status and education does not 
take into account the corporatized nature of the German political culture with 
its highly developed mechanisms of interest group alliances with political par-
ties. Political parties and certain interest groups are often closely linked 
(Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). The result is the election of parliamentarians 
who represent specific interests as well as the political parties (e.g. representa-
tives of unions or the farmer's association). In order to find indicators for such 
interest representation and the placement of individuals with characteristics 
atypical for the party, the composition of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group 
was analyzed with regard to union membership. 
In the case of union membership this is sensible for the CDU/CSU only, 
since the SPD is (unofficially) allied with labor, expressed by the fact that a 
vast majority of SPD Bundestag deputies belongs to unions. The CDU/CSU 
may seek to balance its parliamentary composition by placing union members 
on party lists, possibly as a response to demands made by the CDA, an orga-
nization of employees within the CDU/CSU. Table 2 shows that this is indeed 
the case. In contrast to the 2.4% of the CDU Wahlkreis deputies who are in a 
union, 18.2% of the party's list delegates are union members. This disparity is 
significant considering the CDU/CSU's traditional constituency. Naturally, 
union members constitute a minority of the CDU/CSU; however, the emphasis 
should not be on the number of union-member deputies, but on the fact that 
most of them reach the Bundestag through party lists. 
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Which route do new members take to the Bundestag? We can split the 
Bundestag deputies according to whether they are junior or senior members of 
the chamber. For our purposes, junior members are defined as freshmen or 
second term members, while senior members have a seniority of three or more 
terms. If we exclude members from the regional strongholds (Hochburgen) 
where the opportunity to bring new members into the Bundestag consists al-
most exclusively of election in the districts, (12) we find that there is a distinct 
difference between the SPD and the CDU/CSU: In 1987, the election under 
consideration here, the SPD brought in new members predominantly by way of 
the Wahlkreise, while there was little difference in the case of the CDU/CSU. 
To put it another way: Senior members of the SPD were elected mainly from 
party lists while the experienced CDU/CSU delegates were equally likely to 
come from party lists or have their own districts. Since the CDU/CSU usually 
wins almost two thirds of the district races even in the non-strongholds, the 
number of junior members elected from party lists is high. 
Thus it appears that the SPD recruits more individuals with university 
degrees for the Bundestag by way of the party lists. This may be explained by a 
need for expertise for committee work or the greater likelihood of academics to 
gain political experience solely as party functionaries. While the use of the 
party lists is limited in the case of the CDU/CSU because of its success in the 
Wahlkreise, the select examples of union members and education show that the 
PR element of the electoral system is conducive to the representation of mi-
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norities in the parties' parliamentary groups. However, interestingly enough, 
new SPD members got elected in Wahlkreise — at least in 1987 — and not via 
party lists. Different ideologies and different needs are factors influencing the 
composition of the legislature; yet, they are not the sole reasons for the diffe-
rent compositions of the parties' parliamentary groups. To what extent political 
parties have opportunities to use the electoral system and thus structure the 
composition of the legislature depends considerably on the strategic positions 
the political parties are, i.e. on the structural constraints imposed on their op-
portunities for maneuvers. 
Conclusions 
The social and political profile of one important segment of (West) Germany's 
political elite, the members of the German Bundestag, has changed consi-
derably during the course of the post-war period. There has been a steady trend 
toward the academization and institutionalization of the Bundestag. Moreover, 
once existing differences between political parties — such as differences of 
socio-economic status — have narrowed considerably in the past forty-some 
years. In many ways, while the Federal Republic became institutionalized as a 
political system, the composition of the Bundestag became more homogeneous 
over time. However, there have also been a distinct breaks in these trends, in 
particular most recently after the unification of the two German states. In the 
aggregate, representatives from the East are younger and have higher levels of 
formal education than those from the West. Yet, within the parties' parlia-
mentary groups, we also find considerable homogeneity among eastern and 
western deputies. 
What is particularly interesting about the German case, is the way in which 
the electoral system helps structure the socio-demographic and political com-
position of the Bundestag. These institutional rules, consisting of a mixture of 
proportional representation and first-past-the-post, provide the political parties 
with different strategic opportunities. Naturally, the conclusion that political 
parties have opportunities to use an electoral system strategically is not new. 
What is interesting about the German case is that the two elements of the 
electoral system (PR and single member, simple majority district rule) condi-
tion one another, but to a different extent for different political parties. 
Both parties elect a greater number of women to the legislature by way of the 
PR element. In particular, the SPD elects more highly educated members to the 
Bundestag through the party lists, while the CDU/CSU increases the number of 
union members by the same mechanism. However, the success of PR is me-
diated by the parties' different regional strengths since the proportion of Wahl-
kreis members to party list delegates within the parliamentary group of the 
party differs for the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The parties' electoral histories 
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show that the CDU/CSU traditionally has an edge in the districts, and thus a 
larger proportion of its parliamentary group elected to the parliament via that 
route. The SPD's senior members are elected mainly via party lists, while the 
CDU/CSU's senior deputies are equally likely come from districts and party 
lists. This also means that the SPD tends to get new members elected to the 
Bundestag via districts, while there is little difference in the case of the 
CDU/CSU. 
The case of women is particularly crucial. Those who believe that more 
women should be represented in the democratic process find that women (or 
other minorities) appear to have had a more difficult time overcoming the 
hurdle of being nominated in, and win, Wahlkreise; the local nomination pro-
cess tends to favor men (or more traditional party candidates in general). Mo-
reover, in the case of the SPD, the seniority distribution in the SPD Bundes-
tagsfraktion (parliamentary group) has traditionally favored more senior mem-
bers, i.e. men, with regard to the placement on the party lists so that women 
may have difficulty obtaining safe party list nominations. 
What does all this mean for the parties' strategies? What are the mechanisms 
parties can use to alleviate these differences and difficulties? The SPD is the 
only party which now employs a strategy »from above« as it requires all party 
offices to be filled with equal proportions of men and women. By requiring 
more women to get involved in the party's affairs it is expected that more will 
eventually run for elective office. This directive has led to the criticism that the 
new female SPD politicians are »quota women« (Quotenfrauen) who lack the 
necessary qualifications. It is questionable whether the strategy from above is 
the only useful strategy a party can employ since it necessitates a broad accep-
tance of such mechanisms — especially at the grass roots level. Aside from 
ideological reasons, such a mechanism may be difficult to implement in a less 
hierarchically organized and more heterogenous party such as the CDU/CSU in 
light of the sheer lack of womencandidates for party or elective office. 
The German Bundestag after 1949 provides unique opportunities to study the 
profile of one particular segment of political elites — legislators. There is a 
wealth of information waiting to be discovered, described, and analyzed. Ho-
wever, there is also more to understanding the social and political composition 
of legislatures than the simple description of legislators' characteristics. Insti-
tutions and formal rules play an important mediating role in the recruitment of 
political elites in any system, Germany being no exception. Its electoral system 
is just one, albeit a prime, example for such effects. 
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Notes: 
(1) See Hoffmann-Lange (1991) for an overview. 
(2) 32.2% of the former East German parliament (Volkskammer) deputies 
had been female (Journal für Sozialforschung, 1, 1991, p.91). 
(3) These scholars do not suggest, however, that the transfer of the West 
German party system should extent to recruitment and organizational 
patterns. 
(4) Interested readers are welcome to peruse the data set upon request. 
(5) There is only one member elected in the West who is not a member of the 
CDU/CSU, SPD or FDP: Ulla Jelpke (PDS/LL) who was elected via the 
party list from North-Rhine Westphalia. 
(6) This is of course partially a function of the smaller number of east Ger-
man representatives. 
(7) The German system, once unique, is now being imitated in Eastern Eu-
rope. The first free elections to the Hungarian and Bulgarian parliaments 
in 1990 operated under electoral systems not exactly identical, but very 
similar, to the German system. 
(8) The unification of East and West Germany brought an extension of the 
West German electoral system to East Germany. Consequently, there are 
now 662 members in the Bundestag, 4 members of which are the result 
of so-called Überhangmandate (surplus mandates). 
(9) For a quick overview of the electoral system, see: Max Kaase. 1984. 
»Personalized Proportional Representation: The 'Model' of the West 
German Electoral System.« In: Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman: 
Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives. New York: Prae-
ger, 155-164. 
(10) For an exception, see: Herbert Kitschelt. 1989. The Logics of Party For-
mation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
(11) An analysis of the distribution of occupational status with regard to party 
list and Wahlkreis candidates yields results similar to those associated 
with education. Individuals were classified according to whether they had 
an occupation of low, medium, or higher status prior to election to the 
Bundestag. SPD members with jobs of higher occupational status are 
more likely to be elected to the Bundestag via party lists while the 
CDU/CSU members show little variation with regard to occupational 
status. 
(12) For the CDU/CSU we thus exclude data from Bavaria, Baden-Württem-
berg, and Schleswig-Holstein, while for the SPD we exclude those mem-
bers who were elected in Bremen, Hamburg, and the Saarland. 
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